Robert Fisk: 'We will never cease our struggle until we bring down Assad'

Something terrible happened in the small Syrian town of Tel Kalakh. At the most it was a massacre of 40 civilians; at the least a day of live-firing into unarmed protesters, torture, arrests and panic. Almost half the Sunni Muslim population fled over the river frontier into Lebanon, babes in arms, old people in wheelchairs, pushed through the shallow waters of the Nahr el-Kbir.

Perhaps 4,000 of the Syrian Sunnis made it to the safety of Lebanon to be given food, shelter and blankets by relatives and by strangers and they were there yesterday – 80 living in one house alone scarcely 20m from Syria, desperate to praise the kindness of the Lebanese, fearful of the things they had seen, ferocious in their anger against their president.

One man, having described detainees from the town who had returned home with their nails ripped out and their beards burned off, broke down in tears. "We will never cease our struggle until we bring Assad down," he cried. "For 40 years, we have not been able to breathe."

The men responsible for the killings in Tel Kalakh were members of the Syrian army's 4th Brigade – the same unit, commanded by President Bashar al-Assad's little brother Maher, that is besieging the southern city of Deraa - along with government snipers and "shabiha" thugs from the Alawi mountains. Dressed in black, the latter spent some time, according to Syrian refugee women, tearing the veils off girls and trying to kidnap them.

Tel Kalakh, which lies 20 miles due west of the rebellious city of Homs, had a population of 28,000 – 10,000 of them Muslims, the majority Alawi Shia, the same group to which the Assad family belongs. Even before the shooting started on Wednesday, the military and the plain-clothes gunmen spent some time separating Sunni Muslims from the Alawi inhabitants, telling the latter to stay in their houses – as good a way of starting a local civil war as you could find in Syria. Then they shot into the crowds, firing also with tank-mounted machine guns into homes on both sides of the main streets.

None of the Syrian adults would give their names or have their photographs taken but they spoke with fury of what had happened to them six days ago. Several claimed that their protests against the Assad government started two months ago – an intriguing assertion which suggests the first rural protests in Syria may have begun weeks before the world knew what was happening – but that the protesters, all Sunnis, had been protected because of the intercession of the respected Sheikh of the town's mosque, Osama Akeri.

But last Wednesday morning, armed men seized the sheikh from his home and the Sunni Muslims of the city poured on to the streets. "We were shouting 'independence – give us freedom and independence' and they came in tanks and opened fire, the shabiha shooting at the men at the front; everyone started running but they went on shooting at us from the tanks and people fell everywhere," one man said.

"The tanks completely surrounded the town. People were running away into the fields, the babies screaming, trying to get to Lebanon."

In sight of the village of Arida Sharquia – on the Lebanese side of the border and linked to Syria by a stone bridge – many women and children were stopped by a military checkpoint, but it appears that men from Tel Kalakh set the roadblock on fire.

For three days, the Sunni Muslims fled their town, many creeping from their homes at night as shooting continued across the streets – the entire military operation a miniature version of exactly the same siege that is crippling Deraa – and some men had the courage to return from Lebanon with food for their families. Others did not dare. Tel Kalakh – just like Deraa – is not only surrounded, but all electricity and water supplies have been cut.

So fearful were those who had avoided the killings that they hid in their homes for more than 24 hours, too frightened to attend the funerals of the dead. "We didn't want to risk being killed again," another man said, apologising for not being able to give me even his first name. "The close families of the dead went to the cemetery and some old people. That was all."

One of the 40 dead was Muntaser Akeri, he said, a cousin of the arrested sheikh. Villagers tell different stories of the events. Shooting apparently went on for more than 24 hours and it was only on Thursday that some of the men dragged away in buses and cars by the "mukhabarat" secret police came back.

"Some had had their fingernails torn out and the ones with beards had had them burnt off," another man said. "There were so many soldiers and plain-clothes police and thugs that we couldn't escape. The Alawis didn't join our protest. We were alone."

Arida lies on both sides of the border of Lebanon – Sharquia means "east" and the western side of the town – Arida Gharbia – stands scarcely 20m away across the river, inside Syria.

Along with the refugees, it is also a smuggling centre – indeed,children were bringing barrels of Syrian propane gas across the river yesterday – and it was possible to talk to Syrians on the other side of the water. So close to Syria are the refugees that while I was talking to them, my Lebanese mobile phone kept switching to the "Syriatel" mobile system in Damascus, the message "ping" constantly – and ominously – drawing my attention to the words "Welcome to Syria... for tourist guide, dial 1555. Enjoy your stay."

But the men and women – and the hundreds of children – from Tel Kalakh have torn the lid off any such fantasy. Here at last were Syrians who had just fled their town, talking for the first time of their suffering, free of the mukhabarat, abusing the Assad family. A few had tried to return. One woman I spoke to walked back to Tel Kalakh yesterday morning and returned in the afternoon, shouting that it was a "hostile" town in which it was impossible for the Sunni Muslims to live. Many of the men said that all government jobs were given to Alawi citizens of Tel Kalakh, never to them.

There is, of course, room for exaggeration. No one could explain to me why so many soldiers were being killed in Syria although they said their own protests had been totally unarmed. Shooting is still heard at night on the Syrian side of the frontier, a phenomenon that has persuaded the Lebanese army to send night patrols through the orchards and olive groves on the Lebanese side. Just in case the Syrian military is tempted to chase in hot pursuit of their own refugees.

Robert Fisk hears the defiance of Syrian refugees

The Independent

Syrian families carry their belongings as they arrive by foot in Wadi Khaled area, northern Lebanon, near the border with Syria

Egypt crisis: protesters vow 'massive' demonstrations to dislodge defiant Hosni Mubarak

Furious Egyptian demonstrators have vowed to mount their biggest protests yet after President Hosni Mubarak dashed expectations by pledging once again to stay in office.

At the end of a dramatic day which saw the powerful army promise to give Egypt's protest movement all it wanted, raising hopes that the president would end his 30 year rule, Mr Mubarak instead said on television again that he would stay on till September.

The move enraged protesters and angered foreign powers, with the United States increasing international pressure on Mr Mubarak to quit.

After the president's speech, Barack Obama released a statement demanding an "unequivocal path toward genuine democracy" in Egypt, which has long been supported by massive US aid.

"The Egyptian people have been told that there was a transition of authority, but it is not yet clear that this transition is immediate, meaningful or sufficient," he said.

"Too many Egyptians remain unconvinced that the government is serious about a genuine transition to democracy, and it is the responsibility of the government to speak clearly to the Egyptian people and the world."

By Adrian Blomfield, and Nick Meo in Cairo 8:07AM GMT 11 Feb 2011

The Telegraph

Egypt's real state of emergency is its repressed democracy

Egypt has recently held yet another fraudulent and farcical election. Ballot boxes were stuffed. Votes were bought. People who considered voting for the opposition were subjected to violence by professional thugs. And these transgressions have been well documented by human rights groups.

Democracy must mean more than merely going through the motions.

In theory, Egypt has a constitution and laws that reflect the will of its people. But in reality, the provisions are a hodgepodge that perpetuates the iron grip of the ruling regime. President Hosni Mubarak enjoys imperial powers. There is no legislative oversight of the military budget. No more than five people are permitted to assemble without permission to stage a peaceful demonstration. Universities have security forces on campus to ensure that students do not engage in political activities.

A recent constitutional amendment has made it almost impossible for an independent actor to run for president. Any candidate who is not a member of an officially sanctioned party is forbidden to have a headquarters or to raise funds. Political activists are often blocked from renting venues for meetings. In the 12 months since I began campaigning for reform in Egypt, I have received a flood of requests for interviews, but after the recent crackdown on the media hardly any local TV stations have dared to express interest in talking to me.

In theory, Egypt has multiple political parties. In practice, establishing such a party requires permission from a committee dominated by the National Democratic Party (NDP) - the political machine that has kept Mubarak in power since 1981. And any new party must exist for five years before it can field a presidential candidate.

In theory, Egypt has an elected president. But over the past half-century, the country has had only three rulers. There were differences in their style and vision, but all have presided over an authoritarian and repressive political system. For the past 29 years, Egyptian society has existed under a draconian "state of emergency," a tool that has allowed the president to suspend basic constitutional protections and that has been used to detain, torture and sometimes kill those who dare to dissent.

In theory, Egypt has a democratically elected parliament. In practice, one-third of the members of its upper house are appointed by the president. Of the 508 seats, 440 are held by members of the NDP. In no way is the Egyptian parliament representative of the Egyptian people. Although about 10 percent of Egyptians are Coptic Christians, the Copts hold only 3 seats in parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood, a religious movement that managed to win 20 percent of the seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, was shut out of the November elections and now holds no seats. The Wafd, the largest liberal party, won six seats. Both boycotted the run-off vote because of the substantial fraud committed and documented during the first-round voting last month.

In theory, Egypt has a court system; in fact, legal decisions are often ignored when they run contrary to government policy.

Egypt's economic and social fabric continues to deterioriate. Despite annual growth in gross domestic product of 5 to 6 percent the past few years, there has been little to no trickle-down effect. The obscene gap between rich and poor worsens daily. The middle class has all but disappeared. More than 40 percent of Egyptians live on less than $2 per day. Nearly 30 percent are illiterate - a sad commentary for the culture that, more than 2,000 years ago, gave the world the Library of Alexandria. In Cairo, a mega-city of more than 15 million, half the population lives in shantytowns next to gated communities that rival the opulence in Southern California.

Egypt urgently needs a new beginning. The voices of dissent are growing in number. We come from many orientations, from different vocations, from different parts of society, from different faiths. But we speak with a single voice in seeking social justice. We demand an accountable and transparent system of government, with meaningful checks and balances. We want economic opportunity for all Egyptians and the right to live in dignity and freedom. Together we are organizing around peaceful change. The international community ought to support our struggle for freedom and hold Egypt to its international commitments with respect to human rights. The rights of the Egyptian people should not be trampled in exchange for an elusive promise of stability.

The present pseudo-stability based on repression is a ticking bomb that is dangerously close to exploding. Lasting stability in Egypt, as in any nation, will come only through genuine democracy that responds fairly to the needs and aspirations of all its people.

By Mohamed ElBaradei

© The Washington Post

WikiLeaks

Mubarak clamps down on election rivals

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There were more policemen than supporters following Hazem Farouk, a candidate in Sunday’s parliamentary election in Egypt, as he campaigned through the streets of the Sahel district of Cairo.

Mr Farouk, a dentist and independent candidate affiliated to the banned opposition Muslim Brotherhood,

led a procession of 30 men on Tuesday night who chanted slogans about reform as he shook hands with shopkeepers and handed out posters.

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His small band of supporters had barely moved from their meeting point before a heavy police presence

appeared and dogged their every step. Plain-clothes and uniformed officers followed on foot while a police

cameraman hovered around filming. Three minibus loads of officers and two police pick-up trucks trailed

behind.

“Other candidates are being allowed to march with hundreds of supporters and with bands playing music

, but we have to be surrounded by a human fence of policemen,” said Mr Farouk. “I am sure the Arabs

of 1948 in Israel have more freedom than us.”

Crucially for his chances on election day, he complained he had been blocked from registering 300

representatives to be present in voting stations during the balloting.

Mr Farouk was a deputy in the outgoing parliament elected in 2005, when candidates backed by the

Brotherhood – regarded as the largest opposition force in the country – gained 20 per cent of the seats,

or one in every two they contested. That surprise performance came as a shock to the regime of

President Hosni Mubarak, who heads the ruling National Democratic party.

This time, the regime is taking no chances and is determined to prevent a repeat of the Brotherhood’s

gains. Police have clamped down on campaign processions by Brotherhood candidates and clashed with

supporters of the group around the country, accusing them of using prohibited religious slogans. Hundreds

of supporters have been arrested.

The group’s chances have also diminished because constitutional changes, in troduced in 2007, abolished

direct supervision of elections by judges, replacing this by an electoral commission. Although judges are in

the commission, civil servants will oversee the actual balloting. About 5,000 candidates are running for the

508 elected seats in parliament. The contestants include 130 independents backed by the Brotherhood.

The NDP, with about 770 candidates, is running multiple contestants in many districts.

Cairo has rejected calls from both home and abroad for international poll monitoring, citing national

sovereignty. The government has promised a free and fair election to be monitored by Egyptian civil

society.

“Egypt is capable of monitoring the polls to prove to the entire world that we are able to manage

completely impartial elections,” said Ahmed Nazif, the prime minister.

To the anger of civil society groups, however, the head of the electoral commission said this week that they

would not be monitoring the poll – just “following” it. Monitors will carry permits from the commission, but

they will still need to get the approval of the heads of voting stations before being allowed in.

Once inside, they are prohibited from speaking to officials administering the vote or to representatives of

candidates. The commission has also banned the media from filming inside polling stations.

“The combination of restrictive laws, intimidation and arbitrary arrests is making it extremely difficult for

citizens to choose freely the people they want to represent them in parliament,” said Joe Stork of Human

Rights Watch.

With thousands of candidates campaigning and every street festooned with posters, Egypt gives the

impression of a country in the grip of election fever. But there are no signs that voter turnout will be higher

than in previous elections when it has remained below 25 per cent.

Mr Farouk shook many hands in Sahel on Tuesday night, but few of the people who greeted him said they

planned to vote for him or anyone else.

By Heba Saleh in Cairo

Published: November 24 2010 23:17 | Last updated: November 24 2010 23:17

FINANCIAL TIMES

البرادعي:لو كان الحزب الوطني لديه ضمير لترك مصر لمن ينتشلها من الفقر والفساد

قال الدكتور محمد البرادعي إن مسألة جمع التوقيعات علي بيان التغيير هي المرحلة الأولي و بداية الطريق و قد عبرت هذه التوقيعات "عن كل فئات الشعب المصري " و أضاف خلال حفل الإفطار الذي نظمته الحملة الشعبية لدعم البرادعي و مطالب التغيير يوم الاثنين بأحد المطاعم بمنطقة السيدة زينب أن التحدي الأكبر أن يستطيع الشعب المصري أن يكسر حاجز الخوف و عندها لن يستطيع النظام الحاكم أن يحتجز شعبا بأسره .

و قال البرادعي إنه لا يتمني أن يصل الأمر إلي الدعوة إلي عصيان مدني إلا انه سيصبح الحل الوحيد إذا لم يستجب نظام الحكم لمطالب التغيير و استمر علي عناده مضيفا " إذا نزلنا الشارع سننزل مرة واحدة فقط لتحقيق مطالبنا " ، و توقع البرادعي ان تصل التوقيعات علي بيان التغيير إلي أكثر من 3 ملايين توقيع بنهاية العام الحالي قائلا " 28 % من الشعب المصري لا يجيد القراءة و الكتابة و 40 % من المصريين يعيشون علي اقل من خمسة جنيهات في اليوم الواحد"، مضيفا "لو كان الحزب الوطني يمتلك ضميرا وطنيا ما دخل الانتخابات و لترك الأمر إلي الآخرين ليحاولوا ان ينتشلوا مصر من الوضع الذي وصلت إليه" داعيا الأحزاب السياسية إلي مقاطعة الانتخابات المقبلة.

و كانت القاعة قد ضجت بالتصفيق و الهتاف وقت أن أكد البرادعي أن اجتماع الشباب به في هذه القاعة يمثل انتهاكا لقانون الطوارئ مضيفا "يسعدني أننا اليوم نخالف هذا القانون ".

و كان الاجتماع الذي قدمه مصطفي النجار احد شباب الحملة قد بدأ بكلمة للشاعر عبد الرحمن يوسف منسق الحملة الشعبية لدعم البرادعي أكد خلالها أن الحملة استطاعت أن تثبت أن في مصر بديلا ثالثا غير الحزب الحاكم و جماعة الإخوان المسلمين وأنها استطاعت تصحيح المفاهيم المغلوطة التي حاول النظام ترسيخها و استطاعت ان تخطو خطوة للأمام نحو كسر حاجز الخوف الذي ترسخ في مصر فيما اشتعلت هتافات الشباب "ايدي في ايدك يلا يا شعب .. بالتغيير هنعدي الصعب"، و"يا برادعي قولها قوية .. مصر عاوزة ديمقراطية".

عمرو بدر ونادية الدكروري - الدستور

EGYPT'S HOSNI MUBARAK BATTLES TO SCOTCH HEALTH FEARS

THE official line is clear: President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt is not ill.

The 82-year-old elected autocrat, who has ruled with an iron fist since 1981, was determined to scotch fears he is suffering from cancer as he continued a series of unusually high-profile meetings yesterday.

For almost a month now, the nation has been gripped by persistent rumours that its president is suffering from complications following a gall bladder operation in March.

The Jerusalem Post suggested the real issue was cancer after he cancelled two meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Like Cuba’s Fidel Castro, he symbolises the very pulse of his nation but Mubarak, the West’s staunchest and most dependable Arab ally, has refused to appoint a successor, widely expected to be his son Gamal.

With elections due next year, Mubarak must decide soon.

Every time a health rumour surfaces, it shakes Egypt to the core and affects its stock markets. The vibrations ripple across the Middle East and as far as Washington and Moscow.

Despite Mubarak’s best efforts, fears of a power vacuum in the future just won’t go away.

Marco Giannangell, defence corespondant- The Daily Express

Can Egypt change?

As reports of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's declining health continue, our authors weigh in on Egypt's political future in a post-Mubarak world. Can Egypt change? Has it already changed? What are the kinds of changes it will need most in the coming years?

Can Egypt change?: prospects for economic reform

The question of whether Egypt can change makes a fundamental, but typical, mistake about what's going on in today's Egypt. Reading the U.S. press, you would think that Egypt is so brittle it is about to break into thousands of shards, and that the country will be left in chaos and confusion after the departure of the incumbent president, Hosni Mubarak, from office -- whenever that may be. It's true that the Egyptian government is not particularly confident and assured right now, nor the general population particularly content and satisfied. But apprehensive and ill-at-ease is a fair description of the world right now -- so what's different in Egypt? In fact, there has already been quite a bit of change in Egypt in the last decade, and most Egyptians are simultaneously pleased, eager for more, and uneasy about it. The question is not whether to change but how fast and how well change can be managed.

One need only start with the basic dilemma, which is not the succession to Hosni Mubarak. There are, give or take, about 80 million Egyptians. About 40,000 babies were born in Egypt this week -- half as many as were born in the entire United States -- and there will more than 2 million new Egyptians by the end of the year. Most of these children face daunting challenges. Twenty percent of them will be brought up on less than a dollar a day; the vast majority will go to schools that are overcrowded, the teachers poorly trained and even more poorly paid. They will consume more of the Nile's water, and they will encounter a job market that requires skills they won't have.

The policy challenges in Egypt are obvious, and they are on the front pages of the local newspapers daily. Just this week, the simmering disputes with the riparian states of the Nile Basin jostled for the headlines with complaints about low scores on the annual school-leavers exams. Less apparent is the perennial search for foreign financing -- public and private -- that keeps the government coffers from emptying and that has fueled a respectable six to seven percent growth rate in GDP since 2007 (and even in the depths of the global financial crisis, Egypt sustained a 4.5 percent growth rate, thanks in ironic part to its still small and old-fashioned banking sector).

These are the conventional policy problems that confront the current Egyptian government, and will confront any other Egyptian government. But it is worth noting that the horizons of the growing population of Egypt are also changing. Fifteen years ago, there were no mobile phones in Egypt; 10 years ago there were a million. Today, there are 60 million mobile phones in Egypt -- many of them smart phones capable of accessing the Internet and communicating via SMS and MMS. There are now numerous Egyptian private satellite television stations, and a thriving, contentious press. It was the current government, committed as it is to taking advantage of the new information and communication technologies, that made this possible.

This technology may well have made a few Egyptians billionaires, but it has also made navigating Cairo's dreadful traffic easier. It makes organizing spontaneous demonstrations of affection for the Egyptian national football team, or support for Mohammed El-Baradei's calls for change, or protest against government labor policies, much easier. It facilitates the flow of information -- true and false -- and it changes the relationships within families, as women and children renegotiate their independence and autonomy while staying always a phone call away.

In part, perhaps because of the quickening pace of life, and against the conventional stereotypes, Egyptians are getting impatient. They see change, both good and bad, all around them, and they are eager to see it sorted out, organized, channeled, and effectively managed. The complaint of the moment in Cairo, from cab drivers to ministers: "there is no system!" This may not auger well for democracy -- an unsystematic system if ever there was one -- but it does militate against high drama, not to say chaos. Egypt is not brittle; it is navigating though a flood of change, and no-one, not even the most ardent critic of the incumbent government, wants to see it capsize.

Lisa Anderson is the Provost of the American University in Cairo.

Can Egypt change?: political institutions need reform

Sometimes it seems that the only things that change in Egypt are the police uniforms. In November, when temperatures dip into the 60s, they don black woolen outfits. A few months later, generally March, when it starts getting quite warm again they switch back to their white cotton duds. Everything else seems to be just about the way it always was -- my one-eyed barber sitting in the same chair today as the day I met him a decade ago; the guys from the baqqel across the street from where I used to live doing just about the same things as they did when I bid them farewell all those years ago; my doorman is still lording over his corner of Mohamed Mazhar street, and Hosni Mubarak is still the president talking about "stability for the sake of development." Yet, the president, who has worked with five U.S. counterparts, three of whom served two terms, is sick. Official denials aside, the timeline for succession is more likely 12-18 months rather than the three-to-five years that had been the working assumption until the president's hospitalization in Germany last March. Mubarak's imminent demise has prompted analysts, policymakers, journalists and other observers to ask, "Can Egypt change?" While the question seems apt at the twilight of the Mubarak era, it nevertheless seems oddly ahistoric.

Of course, Egypt can change. It changed in July, 1952 when the Free Officers deposed King Farouk and a short time later disposed of their own initial efforts at reforming Egypt's parliamentary system in favor of building an entirely new political order. Egypt changed in 1970 when Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser. Out went the statism, the "non-aligned alignment" with the Soviets, the Arab nationalism, and war with Israel. Change came again in October, 1981 with Sadat's assassination. Mubarak split the difference between his two predecessors -- hanging onto Sadat's economic liberalization or infitah, moving Cairo back toward the Arab mainstream (while not repudiating Sadat's separate peace with Israel), and keeping Washington at arm's length while continuing to secure its largesse. Beyond the big issues of Egypt's foreign policy and ideological orientation, there have been less noticed social and socio-economic changes in Egypt. When Mubarak took the oath of office on October 14, 1981 the Egyptian population was 45.5 million, or slightly more than half of what it is today. Egypt's gross domestic product was approximately $40 billion; it now tops $145 billion. There were only 430,000 telephone lines in the entire country, now there are approximately 11 million. The life expectancy of the average Egyptian was 57 years old; it is now 70. The World Bank reports that in 1981 the literacy rate was less than 50 percent, now 66 percent of Egyptians can read. By a host of measures, life in Egypt has changed radically and for the better over the course of the three decades.

Yet in the category of "if everything seems so good, why do I feel so bad," even with all the important socio-economic changes that have occurred, the country's trajectory nevertheless seems flat. Indeed, in the abstract, Egypt today looks much like the country the Free Officers took over 58 years ago -- poor, dependent on a global power, and authoritarian. The central problem is the nature of Egypt's political institutions. Nasser and his associates developed a set of political institutions -- rules, regulations, and laws -- in response to the internal political challenges they confronted consolidating their power in the months following the July, 1952 coup. These rules, regulations, and laws were inherently anti-democratic, rigged to serve the interests of the officers along with their civilian allies, and formed the basis for subsequent institutional development. Those who benefitted from this political order -- the armed forces, regime intellectuals, bureaucracy, internal security services, and big business (after infitah in 1974) -- have become a powerful constituency for autocracy. As long as the collective welfare of these groups remain connected to the regime, the kind of institutional change necessary for a more open and democratic political system is unlikely. That's why the ruling-National Democratic Party's "New Thinking and Priorities" was never intended to do anything other than institutionalize the power of the ruling party under the guise of political change. Reform conflicts with the worldview and material interests of Egypt's leaders and their constituents.

It is not just the formal institutions of the state, however, but a whole series of unwritten rules that shape the way Egyptians calculate what is in their best interests. To be sure, this is hardly unique to Egyptian society, but it nevertheless provides some insight into change and Egypt's apparent resistance to it. There is a curious tendency for some reform-minded young professionals to throw their lot in with the regime, despite a professed desire for a fundamental transformation of Egyptian politics and society. Protestations abound about the desire to effect change from working within the state apparatus, but reality is that the Egyptian regime manifests a powerful system of reward and punishment that encourages a measure of political conformity for those not willing to take their risks with Egypt's vaunted internal security services.

The inevitable question, "What can we do about this?" is the sine qua non of all Washington policy discussions. The answer is precious little. Institutional change is rare because it is hard and almost always associated with some sort of dramatic disequilibrium -- defeat in war, revolution, or economic collapse. Yet, there are some things that outsiders can do particularly in the context of Egypt's looming succession so that when Hosni Mubarak does take his last sail up the Nile, Washington has made it clear that it is on the side of transparency, free and fair elections, and non-violence. Still, these kinds of declarations of principle say more about the United States, which is a good thing, than the likelihood they will influence the thinking of Egypt's new leader who will be seeking to consolidate his hold on power and thus dependent on the very same groups who have an abiding interest in maintaining the status quo.

Steven A. Cook is the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Can Egypt change?: reviewing a decade of changes

Egypt these days feels like a restless sea, pulling this way and that, without a clear direction. One can make a reasonable argument that all these shifting currents are really about economic and labor grievances, or human rights abuses, or the youth bulge, or the need for political reform, or presidential succession. One can argue that Egypt is on the cusp of profound change or that it will get a succession over with in the next year or two and go back to pretty much the status quo ante.

But rather than trying to puzzle out how change might come in Egypt, perhaps it is more useful to describe in broad terms what has already changed. Looking at political life, when I think of the Egypt of ten years ago (let alone 20 or 30), I can hardly believe how different it is today. As recently as 2000, Egyptians got their information primarily from government-controlled media and public discussion of controversial issues was tightly limited. Ask Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who landed in jail that year for making a joke about the possibilitythat Egypt would attempt a hereditary succession along the lines of Syria's. Now, while journalists and bloggers still face harassment, the train has left the station when it comes to media. The independent daily al-Masry al-Youm outsells the government papers, satellite talk shows probe into sensitive corners of political and social life, and young journalists and bloggers are as ubiquitous in Cairo as taxicabs. A few taboos remain, notably any direct criticism of the Egyptian military.

Similarly, ten years ago leaders or employees of non-governmental organizations treating sensitive issues such as human rights or political freedom were treated as enemies of the state, subject to frequent harassment and always in fear of arrest or intimidation. Parents would be concerned for the future of a son or daughter who went to work for such an NGO. Now, while NGO leaders are still not beloved by the government, they have the ear of the public. Their opinions appear prominently in the independent media, but also sometimes on the pages of government organs such as al-Ahram. Egyptian government officials give them a polite (if irritated) hearing in the U.N. Human Rights Council and are obligated to reply to their recommendations. And working for a human rights NGO no longer places a young Egyptian on the fringes of society; it has become legitimate in many social quarters.

This is where I see some of the big changes. There are spheres of public activity that once were off limits -- free media and civil society advocacy -- that now have become legitimate in the eyes of the government, and even more important, in the eyes of Egyptian citizens. While the regime will still occasionally make an example of a journalist or civil society activist, increasingly Egyptians view this as unacceptable, as injustice rather than as expected punishment for transgressing unwritten rules. Witness the surprisingly vigorous reaction to the beating death of Khaled Said in early June. Egyptian citizens increasingly act as though they believe they have certain rights and should not be subjected to the caprices of the regime.

There is another sphere of public activity that has not yet become legitimate in Egypt, but that might be getting there, and that is political contestation. So far, most Egyptians do not behave as though they have the right to choose their rulers and call them to account through the ballot box. Certainly the regime does not consider politics to be legitimate. But the surprisingly positive reaction of Egyptian citizens to the seven-point initiative of Mohammed ElBaradei --which would make real political contestation legitimate -- suggests that the idea is gaining ground among the public. Whether or not Dr. ElBaradei gets his million signatures (apparently he is about 20 percent along the way after a few months), if citizens on a large scale start acting as though they want and deserve open political contestation, we are looking at big change. And if that happens, the United States will have some tough choices to make about whether it values more its friendship with the regime or with the people of Egypt.

Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin.

FOREIGN POLICY

Egyptian leader's health on radar of U.S.

US and Western intelligence agencies assess that Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak is terminally ill, and the Obama administration is closely watching the expected transition of power in a nation that for decades has been an anchor of stability in the volatile Middle East and a key U.S.ally.

Mr. Mubarak on Sunday held meetings with Israeli Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu; President Obama's special envoy to the Middle East conflict, George J. Mitchell; and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas.

Nonetheless, the 82-year-old Egyptian leader is thought by most Western intelligence agencies to be dying from terminal cancer affecting his stomach and pancreas.

Earlier this month, several Arab and Hebrew newspapers reported thatMr. Mubarak recently sought treatment for his ailment at a hospital inFrance. A senior Egyptian government official interviewed for this article said those reports were "without any factual basis whatsoever."

There are, however, other indications that Mr. Mubarak's health is failing. In March, the Egyptian leader traveled to Germany for what at the time was said to be gallbladder surgery, a treatment that took him out of action for six weeks, according to a special report on Egypt in the current issue of the Economist.

An intelligence officer from a Central European service told The Washington Times last week that his service estimates that the Egyptian president will be dead within a year, and before Cairo's scheduled presidential elections in September 2011.

Both the National Intelligence Council and the U.S. Central Commandhave tasked intelligence analysts to start gaming out scenarios after Mr. Mubarak's death and how his passing will affect the transition of power, according to three U.S. officials.

Steven Cook, a senior fellow and Egyptian-affairs specialist at theCouncil on Foreign Relations, said that when he was in the Egyptian capital two months ago, several interlocutors told him the leader was not well.

"When I was in Cairo in May, it was interesting. People were mellow about the prospect of him being ill. Everyone understood the end was near; the estimates were 12 to 18 months," Mr. Cook said.

He said he heard that an entire floor of the military hospital in the Cairo neighborhood of Mahdi was prepared to treat him. He also said, "I heard that they pump him up with something that makes him able to function, so he can do these meetings and go to these public events."

A senior U.S. intelligence officer said: "We have access to, for lack of a better word, his court. We know he is dying, but we don't know when he will die. You can be dying for a long time, by the way. Look at [formerCuban President Fidel] Castro."

State Department spokesman, P.J. Crowley has addressed questions about Mr. Mubarak's health in the daily briefings at Foggy Bottom.

"No one is looking past Mubarak. He is still the president of Egypt, and we rely on him and his government for the critical role they play in security and stability in the Middle East," Mr. Crowley said in an interview. "He is still the president, and he still plays a vital role."

Mr. Mubarak became president after Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by terrorists linked to a faction of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhoodthat later became Egyptian Islamic Jihad under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahri, the current No. 2 leader of al Qaeda.

The Sadat assassination sparked a wave of unrest in Egypt and a harsh government crackdown against Islamic radicals. Ultimately, order was restored, and Mr. Mubarak, a former air force pilot and vice president, assumed power and ruled over Egypt using an emergency law that has snuffed out any competitive political opposition. Mr. Mubarak in May renewed the emergency law for two more years.

Mr. Mubarak has also enforced the "cold peace" that Sadat signed withIsrael in 1979, and he proved a valuable American ally in the peace process of the 1990s.

His General Intelligence Service, led by Omar Suleiman, played a key role in training the preventive security services for the Palestinian Authority during and after the Oslo peace process. At regional Arab League summits, Mr. Mubarak was almost always a voice and a vote against the more anti-American currents in Middle Eastern politics.

In 2007, Mr. Mubarak pushed a new law through Egypt's People's Assembly that would make the speaker of the assembly president for 60 days while he oversaw arrangements for a special election. The new law requires anyone standing for that election to be in the leadership of a political party for at least one year.

While Mr. Mubarak has declined to endorse a successor, the new law on presidential succession provides a major advantage to Mr. Mubarak's son, Gamal Mubarak, 47. The younger Mr. Mubarak is head of the powerful policy committee of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), the party that has led Egypt's government for more than 50 years.

Other potential military rivals to Gamal Mubarak, whose nickname is "Jimmy" in U.S. policymaking circles and among the Egyptian elite such as Mr. Suleiman, are not formal members of the NDP.

El Baradei the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is campaigning to end the emergency law and open the Egyptian political system to more competition, would also not qualify to run for president if Mr. Mubarak dies in the next year.

"There is a very serious and precise process for presidential elections and presidential succession if the sitting president becomes incapacitated," said a senior Egyptian government official. "That process is competitive, and the notion that it is somehow predetermined is completely false."

Despite the new rules, Egypt has faced political ferment in recent months to open up the political process through the emergence of Mr. ElBaradei, who provides Egypt's opposition with a figure who has international recognition. Mr. ElBaradei won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.

"Mubarak has been president of Egypt for 30 years, and this will be an historic event when it occurs," a senior State Department official said ofMr. Mubarak's anticipated demise. "You have Gamal Mubarak as a prospective replacement, but you also have ElBaradei as someone who is prepared to compete for the presidency under specific circumstances."

The official said the Egyptian government will face a historic decision after Mr. Mubarak dies, and ultimately it will have to account for the wishes of the Egyptian people for more openness after years of authoritarian rule.

"In some ways, the presidential campaign has already started," the official said. "This is different than the dynamic you see in other countries. There is some open space in Egyptian society, but there is not yet enough to enable a genuinely competitive election among candidates, where more than one have a true opportunity to win."

Frank Wisner, a U.S. ambassador to Egypt between 1986 and 1991, said he had faith in the process of transition already established by the 2007 amendments to the constitution.

"I don't know who is going to succeed the president. I have no idea the exact formula that will be followed," Mr. Wisner said. "I assume the successor to the president of Egypt is someone we know. I don't know what his name is, but I know he will seek Egyptian stability and seek the friendship with the United States that has dominated Egypt's approach in the Mubarak era."

In recent months, some bipartisan former government officials and analysts who call themselves the Working Group on Egypt started meeting with senior officials in the Obama administration to make the case for a U.S. policy of encouraging democratic reforms.

Brian Katulis, a scholar at the Center for American Progress and a member of the working group, said: "We all know some sort of change is happening in Egypt, whether it is Mubarak's departure from the scene, or more ferment on the Internet. There is an opportunity from a U.S.policy perspective."

Mr. Katulis said, for example, the State Department's Internet freedom initiative could be helpful in opening up Egyptian society. But he also said he has seen Foreign Service officers resistant to too much change in traditional U.S. policy of supporting Egypt and keeping relatively quiet about domestic repression. Egypt is, after Israel, the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid. It receives more than $1.5 billion annually.

The Obama administration ended support for a small fund operated by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo that supported groups promoting Egyptian democracy and that bypassed any clearance from the Egyptian government.

In May, the Working Group on Egypt wrote to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, urging her to press Mr. Mubarak to lift the emergency law and replace it with a more limited anti-terrorism law.

The Council on Foreign Relations' Mr. Cook said he supports some pressure from the U.S. government on Egypt to move toward democracy. But he also warned that a competitive election after the death of Mr. Mubarak could force the candidates to compete to be more anti-Israel. That could possibly damage the peace treaty between the two countries. "You don't want a situation where you force candidates to cater to extremists," he said.

Martin Kramer, a scholar at the Jerusalem-based Shalem Center and an analyst on Egypt, however, said that he predicted the peace deal between Israel and Egypt would outlast Mr. Mubarak's presidency.

"Egypt has kept the peace deal with Israel through the wars with Lebanon and through intifadas," Mr. Kramer said. "They sometimes pull the ambassador; they sometimes send him back. This is not a feature of Hosni Mubarak. This reflects the Egyptian state interest and is very likely to outlast Mubarak."

Eli Lake- Washington times